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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study is to review the official and unofficial U.S. Army policy toward graduate level education at civilian institutions. Particular attention is paid to: (1) the Army's advanced civilian schooling programs; (2) whether the Army receives a reasonable return on its financial and manpower expenditures on these programs; (3) what effect Army policy toward advanced civilian education has on officer career development; and (4) the plans for these programs in the immediate future. The major sources for information in the study were the official Army regulations and directives pertaining to civilian graduate education of active duty officers, including reports from Department of the Army review boards, the Army Educational Requirements Board, and the General Accounting Office. An interview with an official of the Office of Personnel Operations, unofficial working papers from that office, and papers from the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College were also used. (MSE)

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A STUDY OF THE ARMY'S ADVANCED CIVILIAN SCHOOLING PROGRAMS

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

The purpose of this thesis is to review the official and unofficial U.S. Army policy toward graduate level education at civilian institutions. Particular analysis is directed toward determining the purpose of the Army's advanced civilian schooling programs, whether the Army receives a reasonable return on its expenditure of manpower and money for these programs, what effect Army policy toward advanced civilian education has on officer career development, and what is the projection for advanced civilian schooling programs for the immediate future.

This thesis is a study of the Army's advanced civilian schooling programs designed to identify weaknesses and deficiencies which detract from the effectiveness of the programs in meeting the overall needs of the service and to suggest areas of improvement which will lead to a greater return to the Army on the manpower and dollar investment and alleviate certain counter-effective career development implications.

Limitations of the Thesis

The thesis is limited by the following parameters:

(1) Analysis is limited to the Army's advanced civilian education programs. References to military schooling systems and to the undergraduate civilian schooling programs are used only for introductory or comparison purposes. There is no attempt to describe or analyze either of these programs in depth.

(2) Emphasis is directed primarily toward a review of current programs. While a short historical review is included, it is not intended to be a comprehensive history of the advanced civilian schooling programs.

(3) Graduate level education programs in the professional services such as the Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps and the Judge Advocate General Corps are not considered within the purview of this thesis.

(4) No attempt is made to discuss particular disciplines of study. General reference is made to academic areas, such as the scientific and technical field, the social science field, the business field. However, it is not the intent of this paper to review in detail the requirements of the Army in any specific field of study or individual discipline.

(5) This thesis does not study civilian graduate education, per se. Although current trends and controversies in the field of civilian graduate education may be referenced, no detailed analysis of these factors is made.

Research Methods

A combination of the descriptive method and the survey method of research was used. Chapters 2 and 3 are based on a review of published sources concerned with Army and Department of Defense policy in the area of officer civilian graduate education programs. Chapter 4 reviews the results of a questionnaire conducted among members of the 1972-73 class of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Chapter 5 is based primarily on interviews with officials of the Office of Personnel Operations, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Department of the Army, and on unofficial background material provided through that office.

Sources Used and Related Studies

The primary sources used for this study were the official Department of the Army regulations and directives pertaining to civilian graduate education of active duty officers. Of great value to the study were the reports of four DA review boards which investigated to varying degrees the advanced civilian schooling programs. The reports of the Army Educational Requirements Board provided invaluable insight into the workings of the present programs. The most valuable source for authoritative criticism of the present advanced civilian schooling programs was the 1970 report by the General Accounting Office of the Comptroller General. The primary source for the discussion of current DA procedures and policies for advanced civilian education, as well

as projections of future trends, was an interview with an official of the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, and unofficial, unpublished working papers provided through that office. Finally, a number of student papers from the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College have been written on this or related subjects.

Among related studies or research reports concerning the same general subject, the following are noteworthy:

(1) Brian Chamberlin et al, A Determination of the Benefits Derived By the Air Force From Providing Air Force Officers in the Logistics Field With Graduate Degrees in the Business Area From Civilian Graduate Institutions, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Air Force Institute of Technology, 28 January 1972.

(2) Eric A. Hanushek, Training in the Air Force--The Example of Graduate Education, United States Air Force Academy Research Report 71-3, April 1971.

(3) Gene E. Talbert and others, An Analysis of the System for Determining and Validating Air Force Professional Education Requirements, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Professional Education Division, April 1971.

(4) John N. Taylor and Dennis E. Valentine, Graduate Education of Air Force Line Officers, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, Personnel Research Division, January 1970.

(5) Carlton E. Thorne, The Air Force Advanced Education System, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Air Force Institute of Technology, June 1970.

(6) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., Concepts of Generalization and Specialization in Officer Career Management, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War College Thesis No. 69200, 3 March 1969.

(7) William H. Tomlinson, The Army's Graduate Civil Schooling Program in the Engineering and Physical Science Fields: A Critical Evaluation, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, U.S. Army War College Thesis No. 66187, 6 April 1966.

BACKGROUND

Education has become one of the U.S. Army's biggest concerns. Always an important area of consideration, the various levels and types of educational programs have increased and formalized over the years. This applies both to military education, that training conducted by the Army to teach basic and advanced military skills, and civilian education, those programs leading to recognized high school diplomas and college degrees.

Military education has expanded primarily as a result of the increased technological complexity of the Army.[1] As in civilian occupations, the need for skilled labor in lieu of unskilled manpower has presented some of the most acute problems in personnel management. No longer is the Army able to survive on raw manpower alone. The range of skills necessary at every level is staggering. The impact of advanced technology in such areas as automatic data processing, electronics, engineering, avionics, missiles, weaponry, and transportation has made it mandatory that raw manpower be converted into skilled labor to be effectively utilized. Even in the administrative and support fields the requirement exists to adequately train personnel to master new, more efficient methods and techniques. On-the-job

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[1]Harold F. Clark and Harold S. Sloan, Classrooms in the Military, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964), p. 11.

experience is no longer totally adequate, although it is certainly a major part of the learning process.

The Army has responded to the challenge and now conducts probably one of the most comprehensive school systems of any organization in the world. Within the Army an individual can receive basic and advanced training and schooling in such wide ranging areas as aircraft maintenance, air traffic control, music, food service, guided missile systems, languages, photography, nuclear power, electronic systems, statistics, weather, and wire maintenance, to name only a sampling.[2]

While the above describes primarily the enlisted field, what about officer requirements? Before considering the specifics of officer advanced civilian education, a short analysis of contemporary national and international trends and influences which affect all officer education is in order. These factors, identified in the Norris Board report on the Army's officer education system, are presented as having significant impact on the overall purpose of all officer education today. They include:

(1) An increased threat but decreased resources.

(2) Continued antimilitarism.

(3) The Nixon Doctrine.

(4) Continued sociological revolution.

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[2]See Appendix A for listing of Army schools and training centers.

(5) Continued technological advance.

(6) Increased specialization.

(7) The educational explosion.

(8) The undereducated hump.

(9) The need for fighting ability.[3]

The implication of "increased threat, decreased resources" for the military education system involves getting the best return on investment by setting priorities and by improving management techniques. Education is at the base of both of these activities.

Antimilitarism can be traced throughout American history, but many believe its scope will expand in the coming decade. The Norris Board, in analyzing this factor, contends that the Army's educational system must recognize the force of antimilitarism and assist the officer of the future in identifying the forms of antimilitarism and the issues involved and to prepare him to operate in this potentially hostile environment. It is believed that increased emphasis should be given to the communicative arts and the preparation necessary for roles in civil disturbance operation.

The Nixon Doctrine, which implies a reduced presence of military personnel abroad while, at the same time,

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[3]Frank W. Norris and others, Review of Army Officer Educational System, Vol. II, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1 December 1971), p. 2-1.

indicating an increased role for military assistance advisors, will require educational programs embracing the entire range of social, economic, political, military and intelligence disciplines.

The continued sociological revolution has special implications for the military educational system:

> The overall question of how to maintain discipline in a society undergoing this sociological revolution is a most difficult one; yet it is one which the military must face, and is one where the educational component can be significant. The principal implication of the sociological revolution apparently rests in the leadership field, because it certainly poses new dimensions of difficulty and complexity to military leaders--from corporal to four stars. The broad educational implications are evident: first, the Army must develop and maintain a leadership instructional program of the highest caliber; second, it must establish the authority of leadership on the soundest possible footing, overcoming the crisis of authority engendered by the new lifestyle and the influx of those with values and beliefs not necessarily compatible with the traditional military ethos.[4]

The continued technological advance has obvious implications for the military education system. Specifically, the technological advance has created the demand for many new skills, for new organizations and management techniques, and for continued effective communication with the scientific and technological communities in government, business, and industry. To meet these requirements the military school system may have to make significant adjust-

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[4]Ibid., p. 2-8.

ments within the present structure as well as develop totally new schools and new approaches to education.

Increased specialization within the military is a result of technological progress. The Norris Report predicts the trend will continue both in the military and the civilian worlds, with implications for officer education in developing the proper balance of military and civilian schooling for the specialist and continuing education for all officers.

The educational explosion brings up the following four considerations in the area of officer education: (1) The continued upgrading of the formal education level of U.S. society; (2) the impact of the rising aspirations for higher education among today's youth on officer retention; (3) trends in the continuing education field which could be applied to the military professional education system, and (4) the progress in instructional technology.

The undereducated hump, a term used to describe the large group of young officers who do not possess a college degree, is described by the Norris Board as a problem of urgency and importance, peculiar to the Army. Primarily the result of the large influx of officers during the Vietnam War, this situation has an impact on the maintenance of professional standards, the level of management ability and the retention of junior officers. The Norris Board contends that the Army has a moral obligation to invest

in the education of these officers.

Finally, the Norris Board saw dangers in the distractions caused by adapting to the trends and developments described above. It warned that the educational diversions are interesting and appealing and, if allowed to occupy too much of the educational program, will lead to "a broadly-informed military dilattante who can do everything but fight."[5]

Without belaboring these factors, it can be seen that the education of officers in the Army today is tied directly to many of the complex and controversial issues facing not only the Army but the country as a whole. Some of these factors are complementary, such as the continued technological change, increased specialization and the education explosion. All of these considerations point to the need for changes in the traditional concepts of officer education and career patterns.

Others of the nine factors present requirements which are contradictory in nature. The first factor actually affects all others, for even with the right decisions on priorities and with improved management to maximize every dollar spent, limited resources will limit the results. The danger is retardation of real progress and a falling behind in the area of education.

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[5]Ibid., p. 2-25.

Antimilitarism could have a detrimental effect on the education of officers by the creation and maintenance of hostile or neutral attitude on the part of the civilian communities. Without the cross-fertilization of ideas, skills and techniques developed in the civilian portions of the nation's population, application of the new learning to the military environment will be impossible.

A similar danger concerns the continuing sociological revolution. The military is both a target of the revolution and a part of it. Military institutions must find ways to maintain the discipline essential to the very nature and definition of the institution and, at the same time, overcome the internal and external crisis symbolized by the drug culture, the racial unrest, and civil disobedience. Education is key to any progress to be made in these areas.

The driving force must remain the mission. All other factors are important only so far as they affect the ability of the Army to fight. The Norris Report summed up in this way:

> Regardless of the distractions incurred as the Army adapts to other factors, the fundamental purpose of the Army and the fundamental purpose of its educational system is to prepare officers to fight (from the MP billyclub to the effective employment of nuclear weapons). Consequently, our educational system must not lose its concentration on the conduct of the highest caliber professional military education at each level. This remains the number one priority for the system.[6]

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[6]Ibid., p. 2-25.

The Army educational system is a multi-headed creature. It includes the formal military schools, which for officers are the branch basic course, the branch advanced course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. It also includes a variety of non-standard courses in technical and specialized fields such as intelligence, logistics, management, automatic data processing, military assistance, and languages. Within its cognizance are such functions as non-resident instruction, unit-level short courses, and even on-the-job training. Finally, it includes the education of officers in civilian institutions.

Officer civilian education is again sub-divided into two primary areas--undergraduate and graduate. Earlier reference was made to the "undereducated hump" which pointed out the magnitude of the problem in the undergraduate area. At this time every effort is being expended to allow a maximum number of officers to attend civilian institutions for undergraduate degree completion. Although there are many officers who have not been afforded the opportunity to complete their degrees, the number has been reduced and the long range trend is favorable.

While undergraduate civilian education is a fairly straightforward and simple problem (although the magnitude and impact are not minimized), graduate level education for active duty officers is considerably more complex. In considering graduate education, the needs of the service

must be more closely evaluated in relation to the costs in terms of dollars and manpower, the alternatives available, the political climate, the capabilities of the personnel system and the personal considerations of the individual officer.

It is not uncommon to hear an officer in the grade of captain or major speak of "getting my master's degree so that I can stay competitive." Often the officers who express this attitude have little desire to study in an advanced academic atmosphere or to serve in assignments of a specialized nature for which the master's degree has prepared him. The graduate degree has become, to many officers, a career progression tool to be used primarily for enhancement of personal qualifications for promotion and advancement.[7]

This is not a perception conceived in a vacuum by uninformed individuals inordinately worried about their own careers. Too many factors indicate that, if present trends continue, it will be a fact that a graduate degree will be mandatory to reach the plateaus considered successful in the Army.[8] As an example, this advice was passed to members of one career branch through their Branch Newsletter, sponsored by the Officer of Personnel Operations:

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[7]Ibid., p. 8-9

[8]Ibid., p. 8-10.

> It has been rather commonplace within the Army during the last couple of decades that once an officer obtained his bachelor's degree, he felt secure in the knowledge that his civil education was complete. He had met the requirement. During the next few decades this philosophy will not suffice. The world is changing and we must change with it. The notion that a man can obtain a bachelor's degree in his early twenties and that this civil education will suffice until he retires is completely out of touch with our current and projected environment. The rate of technological, social and economic change is such that the manager and leader of the future, military or civilian, must continuously update his knowledge throughout his career. The attainment of a master's degree is not a minimum objective of the Army for all commissioned officers at the present time. However, an increasingly larger number of positions within the Army are continuously being validated for graduate degrees. Perhaps the most notable recent change is the objective of assigning only officers with master's degrees to ROTC instructor duty. The implications are clear - in the future, the officer who fails to continue on and improve his education, beyond his bachelor's degree, will be falling behind his contemporaries.[9]

The implications of this are clear. The Branch is not trying to make policy, but to project an accurate interpretation of trends for its officers. These trends were developed in the only possible way, by analyzing the qualifications of those officers who achieve success in promotion, selection for the senior military schools, and selection for the key command and staff assignments. Evidently, that analysis, at least in part, supports the

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[9]Military Intelligence Branch Newsletter No. 72-01, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, Office of Personnel Operations, January 1972), p. 2.

conclusion that advanced civilian schooling is one important factor in a selection board's consideration.

If this is true, it is time for the Army to take a hard look at the goals of its educational programs and policies. Is the tail beginning to wag the dog? Has the purpose of educating officers become personal advancement of the officer rather than meeting the needs of the Army? How can civilian education realistically be equated to other qualifications of an Army officer in terms of potential for future value to the service? These questions will be addressed in detail in the following chapters.

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF CURRENT ARMY OFFICER ADVANCED CIVILIAN EDUCATION PROGRAMS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe in detail the Army's officer advanced civilian schooling programs. This review will serve as the basis for later analysis of these programs and the techniques used to manage them. This is accomplished by first briefly tracing the history of advanced civilian education to its earliest origin in the Army and by examining the findings of several Department of the Army boards whose mission was to review the Army's education system and policies. The current programs are described with emphasis on official policy and regulations. Finally, the current methods of management of the advanced degree programs are discussed, particularly the role of the Army Education Requirements Board.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

The practice of sending active duty Army officers to civil schools for advanced studies can be traced as far back as 1775 when the Continental Army sent medical officers

to medical school to be trained as Army doctors.[1] Although this practice was terminated, it was reinstated after the Civil War. It wasn't long before the fields of study began to broaden to include engineering and weaponry as well as medicine.

The first statutory authority for the program was provided in 1920 in the revised National Defense Act. This provided that the Secretary of War could detail up to two per cent of the commissioned officers of the Regular Army in any one fiscal year as students at civilian institutions. The purpose was for those students to gain knowledge or experience in needed specialties. This law also provided that the officers be chosen for schooling proportionally from all branches and that the expense to the government be limited to the pay and allowances of the officers so detailed and the tuition of the professional or educational institution.[2]

During the two decades between World Wars, the advanced degree program grew in numbers of officers participating, with the greatest number from the Corps of Engineers. During this time the U.S. Military Academy began the practice of sending its officer instructors to civilian

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[1]William H. Tomlinson, The Army's Graduate Civil Schooling Program in the Engineering and Physical Science Fields: A Critical Evaluation, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, US Army War College, Thesis No. 66187, 8 April 1966), p. 10.

[2]Ibid., p. 12.

institutions for master's degrees. At this time, however, the USMA program was not a full-time program but consisted of the officer attending classes during the night and in the summer.[3]

After curtailment of the program during World War II, the Army again began the practice of sending officers to civilian graduate schools in 1946 when 164 officers enrolled in colleges and universities throughout the country. In 1948 Congress enacted legislation which authorized the Army to train up to eight per cent of its Regular Army strength and eight per cent of its reserve components strength, active and inactive, at any one time. This legislation is the present authority for the civilian schooling programs.[4]

From 1946 to 1959 an average of 400 officers per year participated in the fully-funded advanced civilian schooling program. During the 1960s the average increased to 550 per year. In the last three years the number of officers participating in the program increased to the point where, in FY 72, a total of 826 officers began their advanced civilian schooling under the fully-funded program.

Total graduates in the fully-funded advanced degree program from 1946 to 30 June 1972 were 12,179. Additionally, there were 1,095 officers who obtained their advanced

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[3]Ibid., p. 13.

[4]United States Code Annotated, Title 10, Section 4301, (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1959), p. 323.

degrees through participation in an unfunded full-time program from 1956 to 30 June 1972.[5]

Instrumental in providing stimulus to the program were several review boards which met over a period of years. The first board was the Gerow Board, which met in 1945-46, headed by Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow. This Board's primary conclusion concerning advanced civilian education was that it was generally uneconomical to duplicate instruction which could be obtained in civilian institutions and that greater advantage should be taken of this type of education. The Board recommended that the two per cent limitation be dropped and that no legal limitation be established, although it recommended a guideline of five per cent of the authorized Regular Army officer strength.[6]

The second postwar board to consider the Army educational system was the Eddy board, chaired by Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy. It met in 1949. Though this Board's primary emphasis was the undergraduate degree, it made one significant recommendation affecting graduate level education. The Board suggested the establishment of a policy to allow an officer a sabbatical leave for a period

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[5]Information provided by Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army.

[6]Leonard T. Gerow and others, Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 5 February 1946), pp. 7-8.

of six months to a year to study at civilian institutions.[7]

Lieutenant General Edward T. Williams headed the next education board in 1958. This Board made several interesting observations and recommendations concerning an aspect of advanced civilian schooling which appear to be most timely today. The Board noted that the officers receiving training at civilian institutions did so to acquire skills necessary for assignment to specific duty positions. The range of skills fell primarily in the scientific and technical field and the Board readily concluded that the rate of technical advance justified not only continuation of this orientation but also an increase in the input to the program. However, the Board went further to recommend that the purpose of the program be changed to include the raising of the general educational level of selected officers in appropriate fields with the objective of developing potential leaders capable of dealing with political, economic, scientific and social problems related to their future duties.[8] In line with this the Board recommended liberal interpretation of the policy in providing advanced schooling to fulfill requirements. This issue

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[7]Manton S. Eddy and others, Report of the Board on Educational System, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 11 October 1949), pp. 6-7.

[8]Edward T. Williams and others, Report of the Department of the Army Officer and Education Training Review Board, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1 July 1958), pp. 53-55.

will be discussed later.

Lieutenant General Ralph E. Haines headed the Board which considered the advanced civilian schooling program in the greatest depth. The Haines Board, meeting in 1965-66, concluded that the Army should continue to rely on civilian institutions for schooling in skills which are not strictly military in nature, particularly since the Army could not be expected to compete successfully with civilian business and industry for the services of those young men who already possess a graduate degree. In contrast to the Williams Board, however, the Haines Board recommended a general tightening up in the method of validating position requirements for graduate degrees and in insuring a greater utilization return.[9]

The most recent board to consider the Army's educational system was the Norris Board, headed by Major General Frank W. Norris. The Norris Board looked at advanced civilian education from an advantage-disadvantage viewpoint. The Board listed the primary advantages as these seven:

(1) Contributes to more efficient command management.
(2) Provides retention factor for high quality officers.
(3) Increases Army's intellectual and technological stockpile.
(4) Avoids educational obsolescence.
(5) Improves Army's prestige with civilian sector.

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[9]Ralph E. Haines and others, Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, February 1966), p. 697.

(6) Keeps Army abreast of attitudes and developments in academia.
(7) Conforms to national trends.[10]

The Board saw these primary disadvantages:

(1) Costs in manpower and money.
(2) Split professional interest.
(3) Sheepskin sweepstakes.
(4) Political vulnerability.
(5) Administrative demand.[11]

While the disadvantage of costs in manpower and money is evident, some of the other cited disadvantages are not so clear. By "split professional interest," the Board referred to the division of interest between professional military education and advanced civilian education. While this could be detrimental in extreme cases, the Board contended the weight of the evidence is that civil schooling complements professional military education in most cases.

"Sheepskin sweepstakes" makes reference to the danger of advanced civilian education becoming a "ticket-punching" exercise, whereby the acquisition of a degree becomes the main end. This serious problem is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

By listing "political vulnerability" as a disadvantage, the Board is recognizing the interest of Congress and the General Accounting Office in the civilian schooling program over the years. The Board particularly refers to the most

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[10]Norris, Op cit., pp. 8-7, 8.

[11]Ibid, pp. 8-8 to 8-10.

recent issues raised, those of the worth of advanced degrees to the Army and the low rate of re-utilization of school-trained officers.

The Administrative demand of the advanced civilian schooling programs is listed as a disadvantage primarily because of the considerable effort required in this area. This includes screening records, selecting participants, maintaining liaison with civilian institutions, contracting for services, and monitoring student progress.

After consideration of these advantages and disadvantages, the Norris Board concluded that the consequences of not conducting an advanced civilian education program would be so severe that there is no alternative. Among the consequences listed are these two: "First, the disappointment and loss of motivation experienced by our junior officers, who are highly conscious of the value of education; and second, the likelihood that the Army would fall behind the educational power curve of the nation at large."[12]

The Norris Board recommended that the routes to an advanced degree be diversified through the increased emphasis upon a broader range of programs. The Board further suggested that officers be assigned, whenever possible, to duties where they will have opportunities to continue their advanced civilian education and to acquire degrees.

[12]Ibid., p. 3-14.

CURRENT PROGRAMS

At this point, a review of exactly what constitutes the Army's advanced civilian education programs is in order. To do this, a logical starting point is AR 621-1, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions, published in September 1972. This regulation was written for the following purpose:

> To provide the Army with the degree of expertise needed to meet its requirements and to perform a variety of missions, personnel will require increasing civil education. This is in consonance with advances in technology and the ever increasing need for communication and cooperation with the civilian elements of government and with industry. For some members of the Army civil education will be of equal or greater importance than advanced military schooling. Accordingly, this regulation governs full-time civil schooling of military personnel at civilian education institutions, commercial and industrial organizations and at service schools that offer accredited degrees (i.e. Naval Post Graduate School and the Air Force Institute of Technology), as authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 4301.[13]

General provisions of interest to graduate education programs state that the requirements for graduate training will be made by the Department of the Army Educational Requirements Board (AERB), that specific training at civilian institutions will not be planned if adequate training is available at existing service schools, that

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[13]AR 621-1, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions, (Washington D.C., Department of the Army, 8 September 1972), p. 1-1.

courses will be standard catalog courses provided by the school concerned, and that the training of prospective members of the faculty of the United States Military Academy will be arranged in coordination with the Superintendent, USMA.[14]

The first program addressed is the fully funded officer education program. This is the program generally referred to as the Advanced Degree Program and it is the primary means used to train officers at the master's degree or doctorate level. Participants are allowed up to 24 months to obtain a graduate degree in a discipline validated by the AERB. The Army pays all expenses for tuition and fees and authorized reimbursement of up to $100 per year for textbooks and related supplies. The officer attending school draws full pay and allowances and he is entitled to a PCS move to and from the civilian institution. The service obligation is three years active duty for each year of schooling or fraction thereof; however, the obligation will not exceed four years. Upon completion of graduate school the officer will normally be required to serve a three-year utilization tour in an assignment validated by the AERB as requiring an officer with a specified graduate degree. For those officers in training to fill faculty positions at the USMA, the utilization tour is a three-year

[14]Ibid., p. 2-1.

instructor tour at the USMA.[15]

The primary zone for selection for training at the master's degree level is from three to 12 years Army Promotion List (APL) service for Regular Army officers and active federal service for Reserve officers in voluntary indefinite status. For doctoral level training the zone is extended to 19 years APL service for RA officers and 15 years active federal service for Reserve officers.[16]

Included as part of the Advanced Degree Program, but administered separately, is the Top Five Per Cent Program. This program allows those USMA and ROTC cadets who rank in the top five per cent of their graduating class the opportunity to attend graduate civilian schools at Army expense while on active duty. The officers selected for this program may choose to attend civilian schooling either immediately after graduation or any time during the first five years of active duty. This program started for the USMA graduates in 1965 and was extended to ROTC graduates in 1967. The officer may attend in any discipline for which his branch has a valid AERB requirement. In the cases of those officers attending immediately upon graduation, the normal utilization tour is deferred until after a troop duty assignment. Department of the Army policy clearly indicates

[15]Ibid., p. 4-1, 2.

[16]Ibid.

that, while the officer may choose immediate schooling, a initial troop duty assignment is preferred from a career development viewpoint.[17]

Another program conducted in conjunction with the Advanced Degree Program is the Scientific and Engineering Graduate Schooling for Distinguished Military Graduates. A maximum of 15 DMGs who have accepted RA appointments may be selected annually. The officer must have a BS degree in mathematics, engineering, or natural or physical science. He will serve an initial two year troop assignment upon entering active duty before assignment to civilian schooling. This program is designed to take maximum advantage of the young officer's potential, as well as to serve as a motivating factor during undergraduate studies. Additionally, the program recognizes the necessity to have graduate studies in the scientific and technical fields relatively soon after completion of undergraduate work.[18]

The second major category of advanced civilian schooling is the full-time unfunded program, officially titled the Degree Completion Program but more commonly known as the Bootstrap Program. There are three separate programs which actually fall under this program. The Degree Completion Program itself, the Cooperative Degree Programs, and the

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[17]Ibid., pp. 7-1, 2.

[18]Ibid., pp. 6-1, 2.

Advanced Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty (ADPRID) The factor that ties these programs together is that the cost of the schooling, i.e., the tuition and the fees, is borne by the officer. The expense to the Army for these programs is the pay and allowances of the officers involved, the loss of their time, and the cost of PCS moves to and from the schools.

The Degree Completion Program (DCP) began in 1956. Originally, one semester, or six months, was allowed in which participants were to complete their degree requirements. The program was designed for the completion of undergraduate degrees, and is still primarily used for that purpose. However, more officers are taking advantage of this method to finish graduate degrees. The length of time allowed for schooling under DCP has been extended to 18 months. In the graduate degree field, officers requiring less than 12 months to complete degree requirements have only to pursue the degree in a field of functional value to the Army. No utilization tour is required. Officers requiring more than 12 months to complete degree requirements are required to study in a discipline validated by the AERB and a utilization assignment is required.[19]

The ADPRID began in 1970 as the Army realized the need to upgrade the quality of the ROTC program. Under ADPRID,

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[19]Ibid., pp. 8-1, 2.

officers who have been selected and accepted for duty as ROTC instructors will be allowed up to 24 months to obtain their degree prior to starting their instructor duties. The officer would then be assigned to ROTC instructor duties for a period of two years. The schooling is full-time but unfunded. In most cases, the officer will obtain his degree from the institution to which he will be assigned instructor duties. The ROTC assignment is considered the utilization tour for this schooling. Discipline of study is not specified but officers are required to study in a field of functional value to the Army.[20]

The third program which falls under the DCP is the Cooperative Degree Program. Found primarily in conjunction with the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, this program offers to the students enrolled in the advanced military courses an opportunity to complete the civilian degree with minimum full-time attendance at a civilian college or university. Generally, the civilian institutions involved offer a combination of the following considerations: (1) academic credit for the Army course of instruction; (2) civilian college courses in conjunction with the Army course; and (3) civilian college courses taken prior to, or subsequent to, the Army course, or both.

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[20]DA Circular 621-7, Advanced Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 23 February 1971), pp. 1-4.

Maximum time allowed for full-time attendance at the civilian institution in the cooperative degree program is six months. Attendance is not funded by Department of the Army. Disciplines are usually limited by the civilian institutions offering the degree and no restrictions are currently placed upon the officer's choice of discipline.[21]

The service obligation for all Degree Completion Program varieties is two years for each year of schooling or fraction thereof, with a maximum of four years.[22]

ADMINISTRATION

The Army Educational Requirements Board (AERB) plays a key role in the Advanced Degree Program. This Board has met annually since 1963 with the objective of validating military positions requiring graduate level education and forecasting the graduate education requirements for the Army for the period of the Five Year Defense Plan.[23]

The board is composed of members selected from various DA staff agencies, with the President and Recorder from the Office of Personnel Operations. The board can receive assistance from agency advisers assigned on an on-call basis

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[21]Norris, op. cit., p. I-1.

[22]AR 621-1, op. cit., p. 3-3.

[23]Army Educational Requirements Board Proceedings (Washington, D.C., Departmentof the Army, April 1972), p. 1.

or by special panels as desired, with membership furnished by OPO.

The 1972 Board used a methodology slightly different from previous boards in that the Board met continuously as a whole to consider all requirements. Previously, boards had divided into sub-committees with each sub-committee considering specific areas. It was believed that by having all members consider the total number of requirements, the experience and expertise of the complete board would be better utilized.[24]

The Board is required to review all positions every three years, so the 1972 AERB reviewed the 1968 validations. Those positions validated in 1969 and 1970 were reviewed for uniformity only. New positions were considered for validations based on the justification contained in the DA Form 2634-R.

The Board used a relatively simple procedure for reviewing requests for validation, change or revalidation. First, the position description was reviewed to determine the validity of the requirement, its relative importance and the ability of the Army to provide a qualified individual for the position. The duty description was then reviewed to determine the correctness of the discipline and the level of graduate training required. Finally, a determination was

[24] Ibid., p. 22.

made whether the position should be designed for initial utilization or for re-utilization. For master's degree positions this determination was made based essentially on the grade of the position. An initial utilization position is one filled by an officer, usually a captain or major, just completing graduate schooling. A re-utilization position is one which is normally filled by an officer in the grade of lieutenant colonel or colonel who has practical on-the-job experience in addition to graduate training. After considering the above three factors, the Board voted for each position, with two dissenting votes requiring a reconsideration. Additional information could be requested from the submitting agencies if the Board believed the justification of a particular position to be inadequate.[25]

The 1972 Board considered 2,553 new requests for position validations, approving 1,095. This represented the lowest percentage of validations in the history of the AERB. Previous Boards had validated as high as 99.4 per cent of all submissions (1966), while the previous low percentage was 74.2 per cent in 1970. The Board also reviewed 1,092 requests for revalidation or change of positions previously validated and approved 868 of these requests. Following the 1972 Board, a total of 6,916 graduate requirements were identified, with 6,793 requirements at the master's level

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[25]Ibid., p. 22.

and 153 at the doctorate level. The Board projected a gradual increase in validated requirements through FY 77 to a total of 7,505.[26]

The Board's report gave no definitive reason for the exceptionally low percentage of validations. One factor undoubtedly was the record number of new submissions. Another possible reason derived from the report is that the Board believed that some requests could be satisfactorily filled by officers with a baccalaureate degree or special military or civilian short-course training in the requested discipline. Another factor was an extremely critical look at doctoral level requirements. Total doctoral requirements were actually reduced by 35. Basically, the Board considered only "certain highly specialized positions requiring Army interface with a PhD level civilian environment warrant training at the PhD level."[27]

Once the AERB validates a particular position as a requirement for a graduate level degree, the management and administration of the Advanced Degree Program becomes the responsibility of the Officer Personnel Directorate of the Office of Personnel Operations. The Deputy for Professional Development, OPD, centrally manages the key elements of the program to include the budget of the funded programs, the

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[26] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[27] Ibid., p. 8.

allocation of training quotas to the career branches and the utilization assignments following the completion of their civilian studies. The career branches select officers to participate in the various civilian education programs and monitor their academic progress.

For any AERB validated position, a check is made of all Army officers with an appropriate degree capable of filling that position. When requirements exceed the number of qualified officers available, authority is given to train an officer at the graduate degree level under the fully-funded program or in the Bootstrap program for a period in excess of 12 months. Training requirements are consolidated and translated into training quotas for specific AERB disciplines and allocated to career branches. Career branches select officers for training against assigned quotas and place each officer assigned to a school against a tentative AERB position.

While the officer is in school his progress is reported to the career branch and to the Deputy for Professional Development. Immediately upon graduation from fully-funded graduate level schooling or long term Bootstrap, the officer is assigned to a validated AERB position. It could be the position for which he trained, but this is not mandatory. Usually, in every discipline there are a number of validated positions in each branch and actual assignment depends on the timing of the officer's graduation. If an officer

cannot be effectively utilized in an AERB position by his career branch, he is reported to the Deputy for Officer Distribution, ODD, who has the authority to direct his assignment against a branch immaterial position or against a requirement belonging to another branch. The Deputy for Professional Development administratively tracks each graduate on a name-by-name basis to insure initial utilization. At this time there is no procedure to manage reutilization assignments except on a branch-by-branch basis.

The management of the unfunded programs is generally a branch function, with the exception of the DCP participants needing 13-18 months for degree completion, those officers participating in the ADPRID and those officers in the various Cooperative Degree programs. For those officers participating in DCP for 12 months or less, the career branch approves the request, monitors school progress and takes normal assignment action following graduation. No utilization tour is required and rarely is an officer who completes a degree under the DCP assigned to a validated AERB position.[28]

Those officers in the DCP for longer than 12 months are considered essentially in the same category as an officer participating in the fully-funded program. A utilization

[28]Information provided by Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army.

tour is required.

One of the most difficult programs to administer is the ADPRID. The problem is one of meshing the requirements of finding an opening in an appropriate school, obtaining the acceptance of the candidate for the graduate college of that school and gaining approval of the candidate's nomination as a member of the ROTC faculty before he starts graduate school. Under the ADPRID an officer can take up to 24 months to finish his graduate degree and will then instruct in the ROTC department two additional years. There is some movement to extend the instructor duty assignment to three years to use the education background to a greater extent.[29]

[29]Ibid.

Chapter 3

WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT ADVANCED CIVILIAN EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Having looked at the basic fundamentals of the various programs for officer advanced civilian schooling and the system of administering these programs, it would now be useful to examine some of the past and present problem areas and weaknesses of the current programs.

A good starting point is a study made by the Comptroller General of the United States. This study, titled "Improvements Needed in Determining Graduate Education Requirements for Military Officer Positions," was released in August 1970. Its purpose was stated as follows:

> A Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum established criteria in 1964 for determining graduate education requirements for military officer positions. To fill these positions over 4,200 officers were enrolled during fiscal year 1969 in full-time graduate education programs at an estimated cost of at least $70 million. Because of the amount of funds being spent, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the graduate education program to see whether the positions required the extra education and whether officers' training was adequately used.[1]

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[1]Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress: Improvements Needed in Determining Graduate Education Requirements for Military Officer Positions, (Washington, D.C., 28 August 1970), p. 1.

This report, referred to as the GAO Report, was extremely critical of the process of validation of officer positions as requiring graduate level education. Generally, its criticism was directed toward the following areas:

(1) The criteria used to identify the positions. GAO stated that the standards were too broad and permissive, leading to the situation that almost any position could be validated. In discussing the inadequacy of existing validation criteria, GAO stated that it appeared that the services equated positions for which graduate education was desirable with those positions for which it was considered actually essential. The report described "essential" categories of criteria as those positions for which graduate education is required by law or DOD policy or where the duties of the position can be performed satisfactorily only by an individual with graduate education. "Desirable" categories of criteria were described as those permitting validation of positions in order to afford prestige for the incumbent or to allow the incumbents to achieve optimum effectiveness. The report concludes that by using the criteria of desirability rather than essentiality, the military services have "substantially and unnecessarily" increased the number of officers authorized to attend full-time, fully-funded civilian graduate school.

(2) Inconsistent application of the criteria. The GAO noted that some positions with similar duties and

responsibilities had been validated while others had not. Examples were cited of inconsistencies occurring at the same installation and at different installations of the same service as well as at installations of different services. The report called for "uniform implementation and application of the guidelines, to the maximum extent possible, within and among the military servicess."[2]

(3) Insufficient consideration of alternatives, such as work experience or short training courses or using civilians in positions wherever possible. GAO stated that, particularly where a graduate degree is not an essential requirement of a position, alternative types of training should be utilized because of the lower cost. Additionally, the use of civilians was believed to be an acceptable option which would provide continuity of operation and stabilize the work force. The study found that civilian positions comparable to officer positions validated as graduate degree requirements generally did not have a graduate degree requirement. GAO believed that the primary reason for this difference between military and civilian positions was the fact that the U.S. Civil Service Commission qualification standards allow substitution of specialized experience for formal education. The GAO implication was that the military should establish a similar system whereby experience in a

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[2]Ibid., p. 15.

specialized field would be recognized as an alternative to graduate education.

(4) Inconsistencies between official job descriptions which did not require graduate education and job descriptions submitted for approval of graduate education requirements. The study found that the AERB had validated certain positions as requiring graduate degrees while the job descriptions for these jobs showed requirements for only bachelor's degrees. This is further indication of erroneous validation, according to the report.

The GAO Report made the following recommendations:

(1) That the Secretary of Defense issue a policy statement which expressed more clearly the intent and objectives of the graduate education program, particularly emphasizing that full-time, fully-funded programs be limited to those positions for which the education is essential for performance of duty.

(2) That the broad, permissive interpretations of the validation criteria be limited.

(3) That the advice of the Civil Service Commission or other qualified independent body be sought in developing new criteria.

(4) That the new criteria be applied uniformly throughout the services.

(5) That consideration be given to using civilians in positions requiring graduate degrees wherever possible.

(6) That the assignment policies and practices of the services be reviewed to insure maximum use of personnel with specialized graduate education.

The Department of Defense comment on the GAO Report raised one of the basic questions concerning advanced civilian education: Is graduate education to be based solely on requirements of specific assignments or on a more general consideration of the utility of education. The DOD comment stated:

> While recognizing the importance of the criteria, we believe the GAO Report has overlooked a very important element in the education and training of military officers. The report does not recognize sufficiently that graduate education is more than training in a particular skill--important as that may be. Education is a continuing way of life and within the Military Services it contributes to the intellectual development of officers. Graduate education imparts to the student advanced technical knowledge. More importantly, it helps broaden his capacity for original thought and promote the development of analytical tools for problem solving.
>
> As a general observation, therefore, we believe that the draft report is too limited in its considerations of the utility of education. Of particular concern is the failure to acknowledge:
>
> (a) the rising educational aspirations of the segment of the population from which we must recruit military officers.
>
> (b) the value of graduate education in our junior officer retention efforts.
>
> (c) the increased capability which an officer with graduate level education brings to billets which he may occupy outside of the

limited range of positions validated for his academic credentials.[3]

GAO responded to this comment by stating that it was readily apparent that graduate education enhances the effectiveness and capabilities of officers and that the opportunity for such education may be an important factor in junior officer retention; however, the report pointed out that the JCS criteria justified the advanced civilian schooling program on the basis of requirements of specified positions rather than on the generalized basis cited by DOD. GAO contended that the benefits of graduate education must be weighed against its cost and that the only justification for validation of positions should be the essentiality of the education for the satisfactory performance of the duties of the positions.

Concerning the use of civilians in positions requiring advanced degrees, DOD commented that the determination as to whether a position should be military or civilian was a factor of military essentiality. An advanced degree may be a requirement of the position but not a factor in determining whether the position should be military or civilian. The GAO Report stressed that to receive a "reasonable payoff" from the cost of graduate education of military officers, stability of assignment was required. It pointed

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[3]Ibid., p. 32.

out that the use of civilians would reduce the turbulence of rotational assignments characteristic of the military and could provide continuity in key positions.

The GAO Report based its criticism of the utilization of officers with graduate education on its investigation of 14 military installations. At these installations, the GAO found a total of 703 validated positions, only 162 of which were filled by officers having advanced degrees. This occurred, the GAO Report states, in spite of the fact that there were a total of 506 officers at these locations who possessed graduate degrees.

A summary of the GAO findings regarding utilization is as follows:[4]

Education level of officer assigned	Number of Validated Positions	Percentage
Less than master's degree	437	62
Master's degree or higher	162	23
Position vacant	104	15
Total	703	100

The GAO commented concerning this finding:

> At the locations we visited, the underutilization of officers with advanced degrees was accentuated by the fact that individuals with less than master's degrees occupied 437 positions and vacancies existed in 104 positions which, according to the military services, required graduate education at the same time that 344 officers with graduate degrees referred to above were assigned to other nonvalidated

[4]Ibid., p. 22

> positions. Some of these officers with graduate degrees could reasonably be expected to satisfy the educational and grade requirements of the validated positions at the bases at which they were assigned or they could have been assigned to other bases with positions requiring graduate degrees in the pertinent academic areas.[5]

Although the GAO statistics in the area of utilization represented only a limited study, the Department of the Army realized that improvements were necessary. Prior to 1970 utilization tracking, a system of insuring the assignment of officers obtaining graduate degrees in programs requiring utilization assignments, was decentralized at the career branch level. Statistics were not maintained, although an analysis of over 2,000 officers graduating from advanced civilian schooling between 1960 and 1964 was made, using official records. This analysis showed that a total of 83.9 per cent of these officers received some type of utilization assignment.[6]

In 1970 the responsibility for utilization tracking of officers graduating from fully-funded advanced civilian schooling programs was centralized under the Deputy for Career Development, Officer Personnel Directorate, Office of Personnel Operations. As of June 1972, a total of 1,847 officers requiring utilization had graduated. Of these,

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Information obtained from Office of Personnel Operations.

1,511 (82 per cent) were assigned to initial utilization positions, 299 (16 per cent) were deferred to meet other Army requirements, and 37 (2 per cent) were not properly utilized.[7]

While DA considers the present centralized system of utilization tracking an improvement, it also realizes that there are shortcomings. The present system can only ascertain whether an officer is assigned to an agency or command having an AERB validated position. It does not measure whether the agency or command actually uses the officer in the AERB position. (GAO found that 68 per cent of the officers with graduate degrees assigned to the installations investigated were not utilized in validated positions.) Additionally, the present tracking system does not measure reutilization of officers with graduate degrees.

To correct these deficiencies, the Office of Personnel Operations is attempting to develop an automated information system which will provide a means to measure actual utilization by the agencies and commands having AERB positions. If information so developed indicates a significant problem in this area, it is possible that DA will initiate directed assignments of officers with graduate degrees to specific positions. This procedure is currently

[7]Information obtained from Office of Personnel Operations. For a statistical analysis of the tracking system since 1970, see Appendix B.

being used for key command assignments.

While these actions are directed to improve the utilization rate of officers obtaining degrees through a fully-funded program, there is no system to monitor or assess utilization of officers who obtain advanced degrees through unfunded programs. The GAO did not ignore this deficiency, stating as follows:

> Since there will be limited benefits to the military service for its investment in the officer's graduate education if the officer is not utilized to any great extent in validated positions, we suggest that the military services avail themselves of the potential for increased benefits with an accompanying reduction of costs, by more effective utilization of all officers with graduate degrees without regard to how the degrees were obtained. This would materially reduce the number of validated positions held by officers with less than masters' degrees. We also believe that, if the services were more effective in assigning those officers who already have advanced degrees to validated positions, a corresponding reduction in the number of officers required for assignment to graduate schools could result. Since the estimated cost to send a typical military officer to graduate school for one year ranges from $16,000 to $22,000, substantial savings could be realized if the number of validated positions were based on an essential requirement for, and full utilization of, the officers with advanced degrees.[8]

The DOD response to this suggestion pointed out that, while the services sought maximum return on its education investment, certain other factors had to be considered in the assignment of all officers. These included the need to

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[8]Comptroller General, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

fill military requirements, the rotation of officers to prepare for future responsibilities and the desirability of a total career development approach. This response evidently was interpreted by the GAO as lack of cooperation and the GAO suggested that, as a result of these officer assignment practices, Congress may wish to consider limiting the full-time, fully-funded graduate education program only to those officers who can be utilized primarily in validated positions. Additionally, GAO suggested that, in view of DOD's announced plans to expand the graduate education program and lack of corrective action in response to the GAO's findings and suggestions, the Congress may also wish to limit full-time, fully-funded graduate level schooling to those positions for which such education is essential for satisfactory performance of duty.

In view of the suggestions submitted to Congress by the GAO Report and possible undesirable Congressional restrictions to the advanced civilian education programs, DOD acted by issuing Directive 322.10, entitled Policies of Graduate Education for Military Officers, dated 27 March 1971. The Directive addresses particularly the criteria to be used for validation of positions and the utilization of officers who possess graduate degrees. Much of the direction of this regulation was derived, almost directly, from the GAO Report.

The Directive established the following policy:

(1) That officer positions be validated for graduate education only where such education is essential for optimum performance of duty.

(2) That officers receiving fully-funded graduate level education be utilized to the extent practicable in the validated positions.

(3) That requirements for fully-funded graduate education be established on the basis of validated positions.

(4) That all officers possessing graduate degrees, regardless of the means of acquisition, be considered potential assets in programming training requirements.

(5) That the services make maximum effective use of short courses and off-duty programs to meet validated requirements prior to resorting to full-time resident programs.

(6) That maximum use be made of those civilian education institutions which develop tailored programs to meet service requirements prior to the establishment of in-house programs.[9]

Addressing the two primary criticisms of the GAO Report the DOD Directive spells out the criteria to be used for validation of positions and the policy on utilization. The following are the criteria categories specified:

(1) Positions in which the primary duties require qualifications normally obtained only through graduate level education.

(2) Positions in which the incumbent exerts direct technical supervision over military or civilian personnel who are required to possess graduate level education.

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[9]Department of Defense Directive 322.10, Policies on Graduate Education for Military Officers, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 27 March 1971), p. 2.

(3) Positions in which the incumbent must possess knowledge of a specific field of study to permit effective staff planning, coordination or command supervision.[10]

The Directive stipulates that all officers receiving fully-funded graduate level education will serve one tour in a validated position as soon as practicable after completion of schooling and as many subsequent tours in validated positions as "service requirements and proper career development will permit."[11] It further states that officer personnel who complete graduate education through other means, including off-duty programs, will be considered assets for filling validated positions.

Whether this Directive satisfied the GAO is not known. There has been no Congressional action to date in the area of the advanced civilian degree programs. Certainly, on the point of essentiality versus desirability as criteria for validation, the Directive clearly satisfied the primary GAO point. "Essential" is the only term used. The Directive does not discuss the intangible value of education in contributing to the intellectual development of officers, broadening capacity for original thought or promoting junior officer retention. It specifically ties fully-funded graduate education to validated requirements. In essence,

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[10] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[11] Ibid., p. 4.

the Directive re-affirms that the fully-funded graduate level education program must be based on validated requirements and is not a vehicle to be used for a general raising of the educational level of the officer corps. However, while the Directive did place restrictions on the fully-funded graduate program, it did encourage continued general education for all officers. This type of education, it pointed out, should be based on off-duty programs funded by tuition assistance or Veterans Administration programs.

While the GAO criticism was primarily directed at the services receiving full value for money spent on graduate education, there are other significant weaknesses of the programs of a less precise nature. This does not mean to imply that the criticism based on cost is therefore the only valid consideration or that it is the most important consideration. In fact, the consideration of cost does not address several of the most fundamental questions concerning graduate education for military officers.

The Norris Board Report, cited in Chapter 2 as the latest of the Department of the Army Education Review Boards, lists a number of weaknesses and disadvantages of the advanced degree programs. In addition to costs in manpower and money, the report cites split professional interest, the sheepskin sweepstakes, political vulnerability and administrative demand.

Split professional interest refers to the division of interest between professional military education and advanced civilian education. While civilian schooling usually complements professional military education and leads to better performance of duty, there have been cases where the officer is adversely affected by the civilian education environment in regard to motivation toward his military duties and career. Generally, this particular behavior is more common in the cases of those very young officers who attend graduate school soon after commissioning than among the officers who have served a considerable length of time on active duty. In this same vein is the development of an attitude that the civilian graduate school offers an education of higher quality and value than military schools. This attitude affects the degree of professionalism with which some officers approach military schools, such as Branch Advanced Courses and even the Command and General Staff College.[12]

The Norris Board's analysis of the "sheepskin sweepstakes" gives attention to one of the greatest disadvantages of the advanced civilian schooling programs. The Board appraoch to this problem is contained in the following:

> There is always a danger that acquiring an advanced degree can become a ticket-punching exercise and thus detract from professionalism. However, we cannot blame the officer corps for

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[12]Norris, op. cit., pp. 8-8,9.

> following the promotion lists: the fact is that in recent selections to general officer, an officer without a master's degree has been the exception rather than the rule.[13]

The Report cites the fact that 62 out of 80 selectees to general on the 1971 promotion list had a doctoral, master's or professional degree. The solution to this problem, according to the Morris Board Report, is to inculcate a professional attitude toward graduate education and to eliminate the ticket punching approach.

This problem is perhaps somewhat more serious than indicated by the Morris Board and the solution a little more difficult. In an article based on an extensive survey of the 1971-72 Command and General Staff College class, it is pointed out that, while approximately 60 per cent of the class either had graduate degrees or expected to get them, only about 20 per cent believed they would achieve utilization of the degrees in the best interests of the Army. However, this did not diminish the desire to obtain degrees. Over 90 per cent of the officers responding to the survey said that they either already had advanced degrees or intended to seek them.[14]

The term "ticket punching" used by the Morris Board Report, can be defined as seeking career enhancing

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[13] Ibid., pp. 8-9,10.

[14] Philip Mock, "Delusions of Grandeur, Military Review, (October 1972), pp. 50-55.

assignments and schooling. On the surface, this would appear to be laudable, and it is in the cases of many officers. However, a derogatory implication has been associated with the term by virtue of the fact that many officers seek the particular assignment or schooling merely for the purpose of "getting it on the record." In many cases, these officers find themselves seeking jobs for which they do not have the aptitude or real interest and avoiding jobs for which they are well qualified because of the lesser perceived value of the position for career advancement purposes.

To term education as "ticket punching" may seem to stretch a point, for all education should serve to produce a better officer. However, the Norris Board points out the negative aspects. Just as certain assignments are sought regardless of aptitude or real interest, so is advanced civilian education sometimes pursued. The officers seeking "to get tickets punched" believe the degree is mandatory for competitiveness, but they have no interest in any particular field of study and do not want to specialize. The Army realizes only minimum return on the time and money spent to educate these officers at the post-graduate level while they enjoy the personal benefits for the remainder of their military careers and, in many cases, after retirement.

This situation not only wastes money and manpower, but also affects the motivation of a significant portion of the

officer corps. For those who have completed their degrees there is no problem. However, for those who have not, there is the implication, at least, of "second-class citizen" status. This adds to the pressures of an already over-pressurized career development pattern and emphasizes the means of the program and not the ends.

Weaknesses have been discussed in the areas of requirement validation, utilization of trained assets, and in the attitudes of officers participating in the programs. How serious are the weaknesses and do they outweigh the advantages of the programs? This is a difficult question and no definitive answer can be given. The Morris Report answered in this way:

> Outside the area of academic preparation for specific jobs, the issues become much less clear cut. Logical questions arise such as, Will an officer who has an advanced degree in political science or sociology be a better brigade commander than he would be if he didn't have it? Stated more challengingly, as advanced by Mr. Roger Kelly, ASD(M&RA): 'Would he be a worse brigade commander than he would be if he didn't have the advanced education?' Certainly there is no conclusive proof on either side of the question.[15]

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[15] Morris, op. cit., pp. 8-11,12.

Chapter 4

SURVEY OF OFFICER PERCEPTIONS

Certain deficiencies of the advanced civilian schooling programs in the area of career development and officer perception of the programs have been discussed in preceding chapters. In an effort to obtain a current indication of the attitude of a significant number of the mid-career group of officers, a group perhaps affected by the trends of the immediate past and any future changes to a degree greater than any other group, a survey was conducted among the members of the 1972-73 class of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

As a test group, the CGSC class has significant advantages in that it is a programmed cross-section of branches, age and experience. Additionally, the members of the class are all officers who have enjoyed a successful career to this point and many look forward to reaching high ranks within the Army.

There are, on the other hand, recognized disadvantages to using the CGSC class as a test group. Because this group has been successful, a survey restricted to the class does not reflect the opinion of officers who have not been successful. Although it is generally wise to study success,

it is also true that many times success can better be analyzed by those individuals who have not enjoyed its benefits. Additionally, the survey was limited to those officers eligible for CGSC, basically those with between 8-16 years of service and between 30 and 40 years of age.

Approximately 475 copies of the questionnaire were distributed and 370, or approximately 80 per cent, were returned. Considering the length of the questionnaire, it is believed that this was an excellent return rate, indicating a high degree of interest among the student body in the subject of civilian graduate studies.

The rank, branch, age and years of service of those officers responding to the survey was as follows:

Table 1

Basic Data

Rank:		
Captain	36	(9%)
Major	292	(80%)
LTC	42	(11%)
Branch Category:		
Combat Arms	167	(45%)
Combat Support Arms	106	(29%)
Service Support Branch	97	(26%)
Age:		
Less than 30	8	(.5%)
30-35 years	208	(58%)
36-40 years	148	(41%)
Over 40 years	6	(.5%)

Years of active service:

Less than 8 years	2	(0%)
8-12 years	221	(60%)
13-16 years	122	(35%)
More than 16 years	16	(5%)

These figures represent approximately the same relative breakdown as the overall class with the exception that, in the class as a whole, there is a slightly higher percentage of combat arms officers at the expense of the combat support arms total.

The educational background of the survey group was as follows:

Table 2

Educational Background

Civilian schooling completed:

Less than two years college	0	(0%)
More than two years college but no degree	13	(3%)
BA/BS degree	58	(16%)
BA/BS degree and some graduate study	132	(35%)
MA/MS degree	164	(45%)
PhD	4	(1%)

Academic field of study, undergraduate degree:

Business	88	(24%)
Social Science	82	(23%)
Humanities	29	(8%)
Scientific and Technical	129	(35%)
Other	32	(10%)

Academic field of study, graduate degree:

Business	46	(29%)
Social Science	35	(22%)
Humanities	12	(6%)
Scientific and Technical	56	(35%)
Other	15	(8%)

Academic field of study, graduate studies, officers who have not completed graduate degree requirements

Business	52	(40%)
Social Science	40	(31%)
Humanities	18	(13%)
Scientific and Technical	4	(3%)
Other	13	(13%)

Of significance is the comparison of fields of study of those officers who have completed a graduate degree and those officers who have completed only a portion of their graduate degree requirements. In the former category 35 per cent majored in the scientific and technical fields, while only four per cent of the latter category are studying in that field. This situation is creating a problem which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

It is also of interest to note that, while the large majority (85 per cent) of the officers surveyed completed their bachelor's degree prior to entering the service 76 per cent of those who have completed advanced degrees did so through full-time fully-funded Army advanced civilian education programs.

The first purpose of the survey was to assess the officers' perception of the value of civilian graduate

education. They were asked which of the following benefits was the most important aspect of a graduate degree: increased personal knowledge, increased professional (Army-related) knowledge, increased competitiveness or preparation for a second career. The replies were as follows.

Table 3

Value of Graduate Degrees

	Graduate Degree	No Graduate Degree	Total
Personal knowledge	77 (50%)	64 (34%)	141 (41%)
Professional knowledge	37 (25%)	26 (14%)	63 (19%)
Competitiveness	15 (10%)	55 (29%)	70 (21%)
Second career	21 (15%)	42 (22%)	63 (19%)

There are two noteworthy results from this question. First, the number of officers who chose the reply pertaining to increased personal knowledge and competence indicates wide acceptance of the idea of the broad purpose of advanced civilian schooling. Secondly, the difference in perception of the value of a graduate degree between the officers who have graduate degrees and those who do not indicates that the latter group perceives some competitive disadvantage in relation to those officers with graduate degrees.

The same trend extended through a question concerning who benefits most from all graduate programs sponsored by the Army. The replies were:

Table 4

Graduate Program Benefits

	Graduate Degree	No Graduate Degree	Total
The Army	17 (11%)	7 (2%)	24 (3%)
The Individual	54 (33%)	89 (45%)	143 (40%)
Both equally	92 (56%)	86 (47%)	178 (50%)
The civilian school	0	3 (3%)	3 (2%)

Similarly, when asked to judge the effect of a graduate degree to their careers in the Army, the officers questioned responded as follows:

Table 5

Career Effects of Graduate Degree

	Graduate Degree	No Graduate Degree	Total
No effect	7 (3%)	8 (3%)	15 (3%)
Direct effect	35 (21%)	80 (39%)	115 (30%)
Indirect effect	113 (64%)	87 (41%)	200 (51%)
Necessary for OPMS	11 (6%)	13 (5%)	24 (6%)
Necessary for promotion	10 (6%)	29 (12%)	39 (10%)

The key areas in these questions are the greater percentage of officers without graduate degrees who believe the individual officer benefits most from all graduate programs and the greater percentage of the same group who perceived

a direct tie between graduate degrees and promotion qualifications.

While it was determined that over 90 per cent of the officers believed that an officer's promotion chances were improved by the possession of a graduate degree, there was a range of opinion on how these officers believed a promotion board should evaluate officers with graduate degrees. The question required the officers to state whether a board should give equal recognition to all officers possessing graduate degrees, recognition to all officers with graduate degrees with special emphasis to those officers holding degrees in fields critical to the needs of the Army, recognition only to those in critical fields, or no recognition to the graduate degree as an evaluation criteria. The results were:

Table 6

Promotion Board Evaluation

Equal Recognition	152 (43%)
Emphasis to Critical Fields	85 (25%)
Recognition to Critical Fields only	22 (6%)
No recognition	92 (26%)

The significant portion of this response is the number of officers who desired no recognition be given to the graduate degree as an evaluation criteria. This implies that there is some desire on the part of the officer corps

to reduce the ticket-punching aspects of graduate degrees. On the other hand, the response to this question also points out the small percentage of officers who consider that an advanced degree should be in a field critical to the needs of the Army.

The following two questions were designed to determine the officers' perception of the purpose of advanced civilian schooling programs, particularly in regard to direct or indirect utilization. The first question asked what the officers believed the Army's return on all graduate education programs could be termed. The responses were as follows:

Table 7

Return on Graduate Degree Programs

Programs worthwhile in direct return	44	(13%)
Programs worthwhile in indirect return	227	(64%)
Programs marginally worthwhile	60	(17%)
Programs not worthwhile	20	(6%)

The officers were then asked how the money spent on advanced civilian schooling programs should be considered by the Army. The choices of replies ranged from normal career development expense, specialized training expense, a luxury, or a fringe benefit not directly related to completion of the Army's missions. The replies were as follows:

Table 8

Expense for Advanced Degree Programs

Normal career development expense	187	(53%)
Specialized training similar to MOS training	122	(35%)
Luxury which could be eliminated	13	(3%)
Fringe benefit for military officers	29	(9%)

The results of these questions show that the majority of officers favor the idea that the advanced civilian schooling programs are primarily designed to have indirect value for overall career development rather than direct return in specific requirements. As seen in Chapter 3, this point was a primary issue in the GAO Report, which held that the primary purpose of the programs should be the training of officers to fill specific requirements.

The officers were asked their perception of the overall emphasis by the Army on graduate education. While the majority (63 per cent) believed that the Army placed about the same emphasis on graduate education as civilian industry and business, a significant percentage (approximately 25 per cent) believed that the Army places too much emphasis on civilian graduate education.

The officers who possessed graduate degrees were asked how they would perceive graduate degrees if they had not completed one. A total of 40 per cent said that they would fight to get a graduate degree as the highest priority.

while over 50 per cent stated they would attempt to obtain the degree as one career goal. Similarly, those officers who did not possess a graduate degree expressed a high degree of interest in obtaining one. Approximately 68 per cent said they were very interested in obtaining the degree while 28 per cent said they were moderately interested.

Several questions were asked concerning utilization of officers with graduate degrees. The first question concerned the number of utilization tours which should be required following participation in a fully-funded full-time graduate school program. The following replies were received:

Table 9

Number of Utilization Tours

Maximum of one tour	140 (41%)
Maximum of two tours	86 (25%)
More than two tours	62 (18%)
Continuing utilization tours	52 (15%)

While this question pointed out that many officers believe that a graduate school obligation in terms of utilization assignments should be almost at the minimum level, it does indicate some level of awareness that the "pay-back" requirement for fully-funded schooling should be greater than it now is.

In a question concerning full-time unfunded, or Bootstrap, schooling, 60 per cent of the officers questioned stated there should be no utilization assignment required. While this reply points out the majority still regard this program as primarily a tool for self-improvement for the individual, it is interesting that the fairly large number of officers thought there should be a utilization tour, particularly in view of the fact that there has been no such requirement in the Bootstrap program in the past.

On the other hand, the survey indicated that a large majority (88 per cent) favored minimum restriction on the choice of discipline by officers studying in the Bootstrap program, and 86 per cent favored a maximum allowable period of time under Bootstrap of a year or more.

The most important conclusion to be drawn from these replies is that the perception of the purpose of the civilian graduate education programs is in the broader interpretation of producing better qualified officers capable of enhanced performance in all future assignments. Generally, the return on the expense of graduate education is seen to be indirect, both to the Army and to the individual. Few mandatory controls and obligations are favored. Approximately one-third of those officers questioned held the view that graduate education should have direct relationship to specific requirements and be regulated primarily to meet these requirements.

In an attempt to analyze the relationship between civilian graduate schooling and advanced military schooling, several questions were asked concerning the officers' perception of the value of the two types of schooling. First, the officers were asked to compare the value of the education received at the Command and General Staff College to that received in civilian graduate schooling. The results are shown below:

Table 10

Comparison of CGSC and Civilian Graduate School

	Graduate Degree	No Graduate Degree	Total
CGSC More Valuable	38 (24%)	101 (55%)	139 (40%)
Equal in Value	51 (31%)	52 (29%)	103 (30%)
CGSC Less Valuable	72 (45%)	31 (16%)	103 (30%)

When asked to state a choice between civilian graduate schooling and attendance at CGSC, if the two were fully equated, 84 per cent of those having graduate degrees and 55 per cent of those not having graduate degrees indicated they would have chosen the civilian schooling. Similar results were obtained to a question asking for a preference between civilian graduate schooling and specialized schooling at military schools in such fields as ADP, management and military assistance. Only six per cent of

those officers holding graduate degrees and 20 per cent of those not having graduate degrees opted for the military schools.

The replies to these questions indicate that there is perhaps a more serious problem in the area of "split professional interests" than envisioned in the Morris Report, as discussed in Chapter 3. This indicates that many officers consider advanced civilian schooling as a replacement for advanced military schooling, not as only a supplement. It also indicates less than a professional attitude on the part of many officers toward military schooling.

All officers were asked to what degree the opportunities in the Army to obtain a civilian advanced degree affected their decision to make the Army a career. The following replies were received:

Table 11

Career Motivation Factor

	Graduate Degree	No Graduate Degree	Total
No effect	79 (48%)	125 (66%)	204 (57%)
Little effect	39 (22%)	54 (29%)	93 (26%)
Significant effect	42 (25%)	8 (5%)	50 (14%)
Deciding factor	6 (5%)	0	6 (3%)

Most officers expressed little dissatisfaction with the present system of administration of the advanced civilian schooling programs. Approximately 70 per cent of the replies indicated that they believed the optimum time for beginning advanced civilian schooling was between 6-10 years after entry on active duty. Approximately the same number believed that the officer beginning advanced civilian schooling should have completed the Branch Advanced Course.

Somewhat of a difference of opinion arose in assessing the selection process for attendance at graduate school. The following results were obtained:

Table 12

Selection Process for Advanced Civilian Schooling

	Graduate Degree	No Graduate Degree	Total
Fair and equitable	31 (19%)	7 (3%)	38 (11%)
Could be improved	71 (44%)	76 (40%)	147 (41%)
Not equal for all	28 (16%)	72 (38%)	100 (28%)
Unknown	35 (21%)	35 (19%)	70 (20%)

However, when asked to choose between the present selection process by branch and other systems utilizing a centralized process, 51 per cent of the officers preferred the present system. The most favored of other possibilities was a DA selection board making selections on a branch quota

basis, which was selected by 21 per cent of the officers replying.

The results of the survey indicate that the attitudes of the mid-career level officers toward advanced civilian education are about as expected. Graduate degrees are viewed as highly desirable, from a personal career development point of view, and almost all officers desire to obtain one. The survey indicates there is some confusion on the idea of the primary purpose of the advanced degree programs and their value to the Army. Officers at this level were not generally significantly motivated toward an Army career by the opportunity to complete a graduate degree, but this would possibly not be true of a younger group of officers. One area of concern is the attitude of a significant portion of the officers toward military schooling in relation to advanced civilian schooling. Finally, this group of officers had no significant complaints concerning the administration of the advanced degree programs with the exception of a number of officers who did not believe the selection process to be truly fair and equitable.

A sample questionnaire can be found at Appendix C.

Chapter 5

PROJECTION FOR THE FUTURE

In this chapter, the future of the advanced civilian schooling programs in the 1970s will be projected primarily in terms of the definition of the goals of the programs and the requirements for meeting those goals. The method used will be primarily statistical in nature, with certain assumptions concerning the overall strength figures of the officer corps and in the relative stability of the international situation and the Army's mission during this time. Background material for this chapter was drawn primarily from information provided through the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army.

In June 1971, General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, approved an education plan which identified a goal that 20 per cent of the career officer corps possess and advanced degree by FY 80. He also approved the manpower and cost figures which would achieve this goal.[1] Subsequently, this has become the most widely accepted figure used in consideration of graduate education.

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[1]Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER Study, "Army Civil Schooling Program Milestone III Briefing," May 1971.

One serious drawback to using the 20 per cent figure as a goal is the fact that there is no apparent relationship between this figure and the validated requirements of the AERB. As a result, the Department of the Army is attempting to make the following determinations concerning this problem.

(1) To determine the relationship, if any, between achieving a 20 per cent goal and satisfying validated AERB requirements.

(2) If the 20 per cent goal is to be the only basis for graduate training of officers, what is the best way to achieve it?

(3) If the AERB is to be the only basis for graduate training, what is the best way to meet the validated requirements?

(4) Does the goal or the AERB training requirements possess the greatest credibility?

The relationship between the Chief of Staff's goal and the AERB requirements are best examined in light of total figures. The goal was originally predicated on a stabilized officer strength of 87,500, which would result in a total goal of 17,500 officers having advanced degrees. It now appears highly possible that officer strength will be reduced to less than the projected figure by FY 75 with

further reductions a future possibility.[2] At a strength of between 75,000 to 80,000 officers, the 20 per cent goal would be met with approximately 15,000 to 16,000 officers with advanced degrees.

The AERB formula for total requirements for officers with advanced degrees is somewhat more complex. The FY 72 AERB validated a total of 6,916 positions requiring an officer with an advanced degree. The board forecast a total of 7,505 requirements by FY 77.[3] This specifically excludes ROTC instructor positions, which require graduate degree holders but for which a separate program (ADPRID) has been established.

In computing the total number of trained officers required to continuously fill this number of validated positions, a graduate degree asset factor is used. Studies have shown that it now takes approximately three officers with the required graduate degree to continually fill a single AERB position. DCSPER uses a factor of 2.8 for budget estimating purposes.[4] It is seen, therefore, that to successfully fill all AERB validated positions, a total of approximately 19,500 officers with graduate degrees is

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[2]Information obtained from Office of Personnel Operations.

[3]See Chapter 2, pp. 32-33.

[4]Information provided by the Office of Personnel Operations.

required now, while 21,000 would be required by FY 77. This would represent approximately 27 per cent of the total officer strength and still does not consider ROTC instructor positions.

While the above discussion reveals that at this time there is no relationship between the stated goal of 20 per cent and the number of officers with graduate degrees necessary to fill all NERD requirements, it does not show which approach is more realistic in terms of probable achievement within the near future. Closer examination is necessary to determine the total requirements of each.

First, the 20 per cent goal can be satisfied easily by placing sufficient officers in school to bring the total number of officers with graduate degrees up to the required level. As of November 1972, a total of 10,877 career Army officers, or 14.6 per cent of the officer corps, possessed a graduate degree.[5] Using the adjusted projected strength figure of between 75,000 to 80,000 officers, a shortage of between 4,500 to 4,750 officers with graduate degrees exists to meet a goal of 20 per cent. This shortage can be corrected by providing a new level of inputs into graduate civil schooling, while the length of time required for the achievement of the goal depends on the level of inputs. An

[5]See Appendix D, "Analysis of the Education Level of Army Commissioned Career Officers," provided by Office of Personnel Operations.

input level at the FY 73 figure will achieve the goal prior to FY 77. To achieve the goal by FY 80, the input level could be reduced by as much as 40 per cent of the FY 73 level. Should the input level be reduced by 50 per cent of the FY 73 level, the 20 per cent objective would be met approximately by FY 85.

In discussing input levels, OPO is operating under the assumption that present and future manpower and budget restrictions will affect the civilian schooling programs. An overall reduction in the in-school manpower will probably be required. The FY 73 level was approximately 2,100 man-years.[6] For planning purposes, OPO is considering manpower levels in the 1,200-14,000 man-year range for the immediate future. Such an immediate reduction would rule out the possibility of meeting the 20 per cent goal by 1977. To attain that goal by 1980, a level of over 1,400 man-years would be required at least through FY 77. By accepting an immediate reduction of 50 per cent of the graduate level input, the goal of 20 per cent would not be met until 1985. However, it would provide a projected total of over 14,500 graduate degree holders by FY 80, a total well within range of the minimum objective. It would allow for the most immediate reduction in the programs with an overall level of

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[6]Information obtained from Officer of Personnel Operations. "In-school manpower" includes new inputs and officers continued-in-training from previous fiscal years.

approximately 1,250 man-hours attained by FY 76.[7]

Whether the reduction in man-years is to a level of 1,250 or 1,400, the gap widens between number of trained officers and number of officers with graduate degrees required by the number of AERB validated positions. This is complicated further by the fact that the AERB positions do not include the ROTC instructor positions, which total approximately 1,500. Adding the AERB projected total of 7,505 validated positions in FY 77 and the 1,500 ROTC instructor positions brings the total estimated positions to approximately 9,000. Using the presently accepted asset factor of 2.8, approximately 25,000 officers would be required to adequately fill all AERB and ROTC assignments by FY 77. Meeting this objective is obviously less feasible than meeting the objective of between 15,000 to 16,000 total officers with advanced degrees, particularly in light of projected reductions in the civil schooling budget and in authorized manpower. Therefore, in order to bring the AERB requirement and the 20 per cent objective figures into closer coordination, alternatives and adjustments must be examined.

First, adjustment is possible in the area of number of officers required to continuously fill one AERB position. The asset factor controls this number. If two officers are

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[7]See Appendices E, F, G for analysis of alternative plans.

trained for each position (asset factor 2.0), theoretically a trained officer would have an AERB utilization assignment every three years (based on a normal three year utilization tour). An asset factor of 3.0 would mean that a trained officer would have a utilization assignment every six years.

The optimum factor appears to lie somewhere between 2.0 and 3.0, based on the considerations of the requirement for officers to attend various military schools and to serve in non-AERB positions between utilization assignments and recognition that knowledge and expertise acquired in graduate schools is perishable and should be utilized at least within a five-year period. The first consideration requires the trained officer to have a minimum of three to five years between utilization assignments; the second sets a maximum period of five years between utilization tours. Therefore, an asset factor of 2.7 would be the highest figure required, while the minimum figure would be 2.2. As an example of what reduction of the asset factor would mean to the overall requirement necessary to sustain the AERB positions, a factor of 2.2 would reduce the total number of trained assets required to satisfy 9,000 AERB positions to 19,800; at a factor of 2.4, a total of 21,600 would be required, and at a factor of 2.7, a total of 24,300 would be needed.

Even with adjustment of the asset factor, it is not realistic to foresee the attainment of a trained asset base

of sufficient size to support 3,000 AERB positions. The only other solutions revolve around the AERB requirements. The total number of AERB positions could be limited to a level which could be successfully managed within assets realistically projected for the immediate future. Or the AERB positions could be retained at the present level and only 50 to 60 per cent of these positions filled at any one time.

To accept the latter alternative would have the serious disadvantage of undermining the meaning of the AERB system. Validated positions would be filled either on a random basis or by using a priority system. The use of a priority system would mean, in effect, that low priority positions would seldom, if ever, be filled and would actually be similar to non-validated positions.

Therefore, if a credible relationship is to be maintained between the graduate training of officers, the AERB system, and the management of officers with graduate degrees, the most acceptable and realistic course of action would be to reduce the number of AERB positions to a level consistent with the projected number of officers with graduate degrees. If this is not done, it is possible that the recognition and meaning of AERB validation will be subject to challenge both within and outside of the Department of the Army.

The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the objective of the advanced civilian schooling programs should evolve from the stated 20 per cent goal or the AERB requirements. Examination has shown that the 20 per cent goal could be realistically achieved by FY 70 or shortly thereafter within the projected manpower and budget restraints. On the other hand, training of sufficient number of officers to meet the AERB requirements appears to be an impractical goal at this time. The two approaches could be coordinated by placing limitations on the total number of positions validated by the AERB, consistent with the projected number of officers with graduate degrees.

Should the 20 per cent become the basis for the Army's advanced civilian schooling programs, one immediate problem area would require attention. This is the area of fields of study being pursued by officers in all programs. The Army now maintains a good balance of disciplines in relation to the AERB requirements.[3] However, it is readily apparent that the primary fields of study in the unfunded programs are almost exclusively in the business and social science fields.

In the past, the fully-funded programs controlled the primary source of inputs into civilian graduate schooling.

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[3]See Appendix H for analysis of academic fields of study.

Since this program is based on AERB requirements, the result was a match between the disciplines required by the AERB positions and the disciplines studied by officers in schooling programs. Since 1970, however, a greater number of officers has participated in unfunded programs which allow relative freedom of choice of disciplines. The only requirement is that the degree attained be of functional value to the Army. This has been liberally interpreted in the past, and most officers have been allowed to participate in programs of their choosing. This has resulted in the obvious excess number of officers participating in the business and social science degree programs.[9]

This will become a serious problem as the 20 per cent goal approaches reality, in that an imbalance will be created between the fields of study required by the AERB validated positions and those actually undertaken by officers in the schooling programs. This problem has been recognized by Department of the Army and the feasibility of requiring officers participating in all advanced civilian schooling programs, funded and unfunded, to study in disciplines directed by DA is now under study.[10] There are serious obstacles to overcome if this does become DA policy.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Information obtained from Office of Personnel Operations.

particularly in the cooperative degree programs where the various schools participating in the degree may not be willing to offer programs in the desired disciplines. However, the success of the advanced civilian schooling programs, if limited by the 20 per cent goal, depends upon matching the schooling input to the AFRB requirements and this will probably require us to direct the field of study in all programs.

In review, it has been pointed out in this chapter that the most realistic goal of the advanced civilian degree programs is the 20 per cent goal established by the Chief of Staff in 1971. This goal could be realized in 1980 or soon thereafter even with a significant reduction in the input to the programs caused by manpower and budget restrictions. Should this goal be accepted as the overall objective of the advanced civilian degree programs, the AFRB requirements would have to be limited to a number consistent with that required to fulfill the goal. Additionally, the problem of correlating schooling inputs in the particular fields of study necessary to meet the AFRB requirements would have to be addressed, possibly resulting in the necessity to direct the fields of study in all programs.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest that this is an appropriate time to review past and present policies and practices of the Army's advanced civilian schooling programs in order to develop new or revised policy which will serve the needs of the Army better in the immediate and the projected future. The question is not whether the Army should participate in advanced civilian education programs, but how the Army can control and manage these programs to the greatest advantage of the organization and the individuals within it.

In reviewing the history of civilian graduate education programs for active duty Army officers, it was seen in Chapter 2 that the practice of sending officers to civilian schools is as old as the Army itself, starting in 1775 with the training of Army doctors. Limited primarily to the medical and engineering fields until after World War I, the advanced civilian schooling programs then expanded both in the number of officers participating and in the number of disciplines authorized for study. This trend continued after World War II to the point where now the Army has

officers in advanced civilian schooling in practically all academic fields. It is true, however, that the main thrust remains in the scientific and technical fields.

The area of advanced civilian schooling has been reviewed by a number of Department of the Army Boards since World War II. Since civilian education was only one portion of the Boards' review of the entire Army educational system, the findings in this area varied from superficial to relatively in-depth analysis. Generally, the four boards concluded that advanced civilian education was necessary for the Army to train officers in skills which were not strictly military in nature. It was seen as not practical to attempt to duplicate such training in military schools. However, the Boards' concept of the purpose of the advanced civilian schooling programs differed somewhat. The Williams Board in 1958 recommended that the purpose of the program be changed to include the raising of the general educational level of officers with the objective of developing the skills of potential leaders in the political, scientific, economic and social areas. The Haines Board, in 1966, endorsed an opposing viewpoint, recommending that the method of validating position requirements be refined and greater utilization return be insured.

The current programs for advanced civilian education considered in this thesis were reviewed in Chapter 2. These programs are divided into two categories, generally referred

to as the funded and unfunded programs. Under the funded programs, the largest and most important is the Advanced Degree Program, while the Top Five Per Cent Program and the Scientific and Engineering Graduate Schooling for Distinguished Military Graduates are relatively small programs designed primarily for junior officer retention and motivation.

The second major category is composed of variations of the Degree Completion Program, commonly known as Bootstrap. An increasing number of officers are being afforded the opportunity to finish graduate degrees under Bootstrap. Up to 18 months full-time schooling is allowed in the regular program. The Advanced Degree Program for ROTC Instructor Duty was instituted to meet the requirement that all ROTC instructors possess graduate degrees, while the Cooperative Degree Programs are adjuncts to advanced military schools, affording the student the opportunity to finish advanced civilian schooling in conjunction with his military studies.

The determination of Army requirements for advanced civilian education is a function of the Army Educational Requirements Board, also described in Chapter 2. The Board meets annually to review previous validations and to act on requests for new validations. Also, the Board is charged with forecasting the graduate education requirements for the Army. A total of 6,916 graduate degree requirements were identified by the 1972 Board. The Board forecast that by

the end of FY 77 a total of 7,505 requirements would be validated.

Once a position has been validated, it becomes the basis for placing an officer in civilian graduate schooling in the funded program or for a period exceeding 12 months in the unfunded program. Career branches are allocated quotas by particular discipline and the branches select officers for training. After the officer is awarded his degree, he is assigned to a position validated by the AERB as requiring an officer with a graduate degree in his particular discipline. Subsequently, the officer could be assigned to a re-utilization assignment which is a position usually requiring both graduate education and experience in the field.

A number of weaknesses or problem areas have been identified either by the Army itself or by outside agencies. These are discussed in Chapter 3. The General Accounting Office, in particular, cited what it considered as serious shortcomings in the process of validation of officer positions. Basically, the GAO contended that the criteria used to identify these positions were too broad and permissive, that there was inconsistent application of these criteria, that insufficient consideration was given to the alternatives to civilian graduate education, and that there were abuses in the requests for validation. The GAO recommended that the services state more clearly the intent and objectives of the graduate education programs that new

criteria for validation of requirements be developed, that these criteria be uniformly applied, that alternatives to civilian graduate education of officers be explored, and that the assignment policies be reviewed to insure maximum use of personnel with graduate education.

In March 1971 the Department of Defense issued a directive which established policy to begin correction in many of the areas of GAO criticism. The directive specified the criteria to be used for validation of positions and addressed the area of utilization. Whether the directive went far enough to satisfy the GAO and any future Congressional criticism is not known at this time, nor is it certain that the services can implement fully the spirit of the directive.

The Morris Board, the latest of the DA Review Boards, briefly discussed several important disadvantages to the advanced degree programs. Most important of these are two which concern the attitude of the officer corps toward advanced civilian education. "Split professional interest is a term used to describe the officer who becomes more interested and motivated by the civilian education field than by the professional application of the education to his military duties. This officer becomes actually less useful in his military duties as a result of his civilian schooling. Although this does not affect the majority of officers

attending civilian schooling, there have been sufficient cases to warrant concern.

The second area, termed by the Morris Board as the "sheepskin sweepstakes," addresses the idea that advanced civilian education might become a ticket-punching exercise. This particular problem area of advanced civilian education is perhaps more serious than the Morris Board implies, for it affects the very purpose of the programs. The implication of ticket-punching is that possession of a graduate degree becomes the goal, not fulfillment of Army requirements through maximum utilization in Army required positions.

The major deficiencies of the present advanced degree programs, as seen by internal and external study groups, are thus seen to be the lack of a clear-cut, universally accepted statement of intent, ill-defined requirements for graduate education, insufficient utilization of trained assets, and the inability to prevent graduate education from becoming a career development "ticket."

Having reviewed the programs for graduate education and discussed shortcomings and disadvantages, an effort was made in Chapter 4 to determine how officers affected by the policy and programs viewed graduate education. The vehicle to do this was a survey of the 1972-73 class of the Command and General Staff College. The survey results found that approximately two-thirds of the officers responding held the view that graduate education's greatest advantage was to

produce better qualified officers capable of improved performance in all future assignments. Only approximately one-third related graduate education to the direct need of the Army in specific assignments. The same relative percentages applied to the group of officers who perceived the return on the expense of graduate education to be indirect, favoring few management controls and utilization obligations, and those who held the view that graduate education should have direct relationship to specific requirements to be regulated primarily to meet these requirements. The survey indicated that officers without an advanced degree consider themselves at a competitive disadvantage in comparison to their contemporaries who do possess a graduate degree. Over 90 per cent of all officers responding believed that the possession of a graduate degree would improve their promotion chances.

Generally, the survey results indicated that, as a whole, the mid-career group of officers was aware of the ticket-punching value of advanced civilian education. Approximately two-thirds essentially accepted this as a part of the Army's career development pattern, while the other third indicated the desire to see graduate education programs taken out of the ticket-punching category by some means. Over 90 per cent of all officers said that at this time they were interested in obtaining a civilian graduate degree.

The final step in the analysis of the advanced civilian education programs was to look at future projections. In Chapter 5 it was seen that the Department of the Army recognized the inconsistency between the AERB validations and achievable goals. Additionally, DA is conscious of the impact of reduced manpower and budget will have on the programs. A review of projected officer strength figures for the 1970s leads to the conclusion that an educational goal of 20 per cent of all career officers possessing advanced degrees is realistic and could be achieved by FY 80, even with a significant reduction in new inputs to graduate degree programs. Accepting this as the goal of the advanced civilian education program would imply new guidance for the AERB, primarily with limitations placed on the total number of positions validated by the Board.

In the area of utilization, DA is studying the idea that all officers participating in a full-time graduate degree program, to include all of the unfunded programs, be required to study in an academic discipline for which the Army has an AERB validated position and be required to serve a utilization assignment upon completion of schooling.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Army has a need for continuing the advanced civilian education programs. Contemporary environmental factors affecting the nation and the world require that

maximum effective use be made of this source of officer training.

2. Overall, the present advanced civilian education programs are not totally meeting the needs of the service either in providing trained assets actually required or in insuring the maximum return on the manpower and dollar investment.

3. There is a need for an explicit definition of the purpose of the Army's advanced civilian education programs, to clearly indicate that all programs are designed to meet the needs of Army for officers trained in specific fields for specific assignments.

4. There is a need to consolidate the various programs for advanced civilian schooling and the regulations and policies governing them, to improve the overall management of the programs and to keep all programs oriented to the true purpose.

5. The primary deficiencies of the advanced civilian schooling programs fall in the area of validation of requirements and utilization of officers who have obtained graduate degrees.

6. Advanced civilian education programs have several adverse implications in the career development field, primarily in the areas of "ticket-punching" and "split professional interest." These attitudes detract from the primary purpose of the programs and contribute significantly

to the present failure of the Army to receive maximum value from investments in the programs.

7. The goal of 20 per cent of all career officers possessing graduate degrees is the most realistic and achievable of all alternatives. For overall direction of the advanced civilian schooling programs the goal should be accepted as the driving force and total input into all programs should be based on this goal.

8. Changes are needed in the method of validation of graduate degree requirements. The AERB should receive guidance and limitations which will insure coordination of its work with the 20 per cent goal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the purpose of the advanced civilian schooling programs be clearly defined in all official and unofficial policy statements, with emphasis directed to the primary purpose of fulfillment of specific Army training requirements.

2. To more easily direct all investment of manpower and money toward the primary purpose of advanced civilian education, it is recommended that the various programs for full-time civilian schooling at the graduate level be consolidated to the greatest possible extent and that regulations governing the programs be made consistent, particularly in the areas of determination of disciplines